This paper claims that the inner drive of the discussion leading to the philosophical rupture between Fichte and Schelling is the problem of the independence of nature. I argue that the otherwise rich literature on the subject, by not engaging with this problem, has led to a false dichotomy between two equally unsatisfactory possibilities of interpretation: Schelling’s misunderstanding of Kant’s transcendental method or his overcoming of it. On my account, once one engages with Schelling’s philosophy of nature, it becomes clear (...) that he, just as Fichte, is exploring the inner tensions of Kant’s philosophy, even though he does it in a different and original direction. (shrink)

Counteracting a widespread interpretation of Schelling’s project of a philosophy of nature as anti-Kantian, this paper claims that Kant’s doctrine of the schematism plays a central role in the emergence and development of Schelling’s project. My argument will be structured in the following way. First, I will discuss Schelling’s reception of the schematism in his Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature of 1797, especially as regards his association of it with Kant’s dynamical conception of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of (...) Natural Science. Relying on this reconstruction, I will argue, secondly, that Schelling brings together a central issue of the Critique of Pure Reason (the objectivity of pure concepts) and the overall problem of the Metaphysical Foundations (the transition from pure philosophy to empirical sciences) by addressing the issue of a schematism specifically related to outer sense. Thirdly, I maintain that this issue is at the core of the overall argument developed in the Ideas, where it appears in the form of a schematism of “materiality as such”. Finally, I suggest that the notion of a schematism of materiality as such offers a useful key to understanding the unfolding of Schelling’s project between 1797 and 1800. (shrink)

Independently of the discussions on the development of Fichte’s philosophy, there is something that does not seem to change throughout the more than a dozen presentations of his doctrine, namely, his constant concern with the meaning of philosophy. This concern is such a structuring one for Fichte that he even decides to replace the very name of “philosophy” by another one, less heavy in meaning and better suited to elucidate the nature of this particular activity that constitutes his own project. (...) He calls it the Wissenschaftslehre. In this term created by Fichte three verbs can be found: wissen (to know), schaffen (to create) and lehren (to teach) – we would like to propose that Fichte’s conception of philosophy can be brought out as the orchestrated action of those three activities: knowing, creating and teaching. The point here being not to say that Fichte had the idea in mind of composing these three verbs (wissen, schaffen, lehren) when he created the term Wissenschaftslehre, but only that those terms offer useful landmarks for the exploration of Fichte’s philosophical landscape. -/- . (shrink)

Cet article montre que Fichte développe une originelle conception du langage dans ses Discours à la Nation allemande d’où il ressort non seulement le besoin de retraduire des concepts philosophiques dans un langage populaire comme aussi celui de formuler un langage plus malléable pour la philosophie en tant que telle. Afin d’explorer cette hypothèse, notre propos suivra les étapes suivantes : (i) nous analyserons la conception fichtéenne du rapport entre popularisation et flexibilisation du langage, ce qui nous permettra (ii) d’explorer (...) les raisons systématiques du rapprochement entre langue philosophique et langue populaire et (iii) de saisir précisément la compréhension du rôle philosophique du langage qui en découle. (shrink)

This paper proposes to reconstruct Boaventura de Sousa Santos' conception of "epistemologies of the south" both (a) as a critical theory aiming at denouncing the impoverishment of the epistemic field entailed by the normative imposition of a certain model of knowledge (what we call "the monoculture of reason"), and (b) as a long-term political project of a harmonic coexistence of different epistemologies ("an ecology of knowledges").

The aim of this article is to advance the idea according to which the Cartesian Cogito, the ground of modern philosophy and the source of the notion of thinking subject, is tributary of a certain method whose legitimation is grounded in western history. According to this hypothesis, there is a certain tool that plays a fundamental role in the production of this new philosophical notion: the dream. The argument will be developed in four parts. We will first proceed to (i) (...) an analysis of the role of the hypothesis of the dream in the formulation of the notion of res cogitans, what will bring us to (ii) an exploration of the conception of private world supposed by such a hypothesis so as to (iii) clarify the specificity of the Cartesian notion of knowledge, a knowledge that must be acquirable in a dream; in conclusion (iv) we will indicate in a schematic way the historic-cultural anchor of the Cartesian dream where the subject is originated. (shrink)

This article advances the hypothesis that the Fichtean enterprise of grounding all possible experience in a fundamental principle has to fail in order to succeed one of its most important tasks: reformulating the very idea of subjectivity. In order to ground this hypothesis, the paper will be divided in four parts: (i) the first one will analyze the starting point of the work where Fichte lays the foundations of his philosophical project (Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre) so as to show that (...) its first principle contains a fundamental ambiguity. We will then (ii) suggest that this very ambiguity reveals itself in the Anstoß, the conceptual tool through which Fichte intends to get rid of the Kantian notion of thing-in- itself. In a third moment (iii), we will explore the effects of this abandonment of the thing-in-itself on the relation between the finite and the infinite, what will bring us to the notion of failure. Finally (iv), we will propose to interpret this failure as a positive driving force of a permanent calling into question of the subject and its language. (shrink)

This paper explores the contrast between two meanings of thinking: (i) one implied by the Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, the two thinkers that have arguably the deepest influence on the constellation of Western philosophical problems and (ii) another implied by the philosophical-anthropological project of the Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. The thesis here defended is that, in the Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, thinking is related to ruling and legislating over the experience through concepts, while in Viveiros de Castros' theoretical (...) enterprise, thinking is rather to explore the limits of conceptual constructions when confronted with the experience of alterity. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the peculiarity of what Aristotle named practical wisdom or practical knowledge. Pivot to our analysis is the first thesis of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the philosopher appears to state a fallacy when he argues that, given that all actions aim at some good, good is that which every action aims to. We argue that the inference is non-fallacious because of the peculiarity of the practical domain, which manifests itself in the identity of (...) the good and the end. This identity is in the origin of what we would call, as an hypothesis, practical significance. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo é um exercício de leitura comparada dos textos Reden an die deutsche Nation, publicado por Johann Gottlieb Fichte, em Berlim, em 1808, e Crítica da razão tupiniquim, publicado por Roberto Gomes, em São Paulo, em 1977. Se, à primeira vista, os dois universos de discurso parecem tão distantes que dificilmente se vê o que os aproxima, parece haver contudo uma flama comum que os anima, na medida em que ambos buscam evitar o aprisionamento do espírito local nos (...) grilhões de um universo simbólico que não é o seu. O objetivo deste estudo é explorar cada uma das obras, em seus respectivos contextos, a fim de delinear os aspectos dessa chama comum que as motiva; após a confrontação dos dois textos, far-se-á, como conclusão, um breve esboço dos possíveis ganhos dessa abordagem comparativa.: This article is an exercise in the comparative reading of the Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation, published in Berlin in 1808, and Robert Gomes’ Crítica da razão tupiniquim, published in São Paulo in 1977. At first glance, the two universes of discourse appear to be so distant as to render considerably difficult any kind of comparison. However, they seem to be animated by a common spirit inasmuch as both are essays that articulate an epistemological resistance to the imminent danger of being enclosed in a symbolic universe that bears no contact with their own socio-political realities. The aim of this study is to explore each text in its respective context, so as to delineate the main aspects of their commonality. After the comparing the texts, we say a brief word in conclusion on the relevance of this comparative approach. (shrink)

Das Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, zu zeigen, wie das cartesianische Cogito ,der Boden der modernen Philosophie, das im Begriff des denkenden Subjekts – einem Schlüsselbegriff des westlichen Denkens – seinen Ursprung hat, von einer ganz bestimmten Methode, deren Legitimation in der Geschichte wurzelt, abhängig ist. Anders ausgedrückt, der Begriff des Subjekts, dessen grundlegendes Merkmal die Denktätigkeit ist, und der die Geschichte, eben weil er Begriff ist, hinnehmen muss, ist durch die Geschichte bedingt – durch eine Geschichte, die sich weniger (...) im Begriff selbst als in der ihn ermöglichenden Methode ausdrückt. Eine genaue genealogische Studie dieserMethode würde eine äußerst gründliche Arbeit erfordern; was wir hier viel-mehr unternehmen wollen ist lediglich, die von Descartes benutzten methodologischen Werkzeuge zu erforschen, die für die Formulierung des Begriffs Res Cogitans (die nach Kants Kritik zum „Subjekt“ wurde) vonnöten waren. Ein Werkzeug spielt laut der hier verteidigten Annahme eine besonders grundlegende Rolle in der benannten Diskussion um Res Cogitans : der Traum Descartes. (shrink)

Este estudo é uma exploração da concepção de lógica como uma “história pragmática da alma [pragmatische Seelengeschichte]”, tal como ela é formulada pelo médico e filósofo alemão Ernst Platner. Da análise dessa fórmula, pretende-se extrair um esboço do modo como ele concebe as noções de: alma, história, lógica e filosofia. Para tanto, o argumento será estruturado como uma análise: da alma enquanto objeto de estudo da lógica; da história pragmática enquanto método de estudo da lógica; e da compreensão da relação (...) entre lógica e filosofia extraída por Platner dessa abordagem. O objetivo deste trabalho não é fazer uma avaliação crítica da teoria de Platner, mas antes fazer um esboço do horizonte de questões que se abre a partir dessa compreensão da porta de entrada da filosofia – a lógica – como uma espécie de história da alma. (shrink)

Este artigo argumenta que Fichte, nas primeiras formulações de seu projeto filosófico, apreende a tarefa da filosofia não tanto como uma Crítica da Razão, mas antes como um Autoconhecimento do Espírito, trazendo assim a noção de Espírito para o centro da discussão filosófica. Exploramos o que Fichte entende por Espírito e argumentamos que essa noção, ainda que ela não seja usada de modo consistente ao longo de sua obra, cobre um espaço conceitual fundamental do projeto filosófico fichtiano. O argumento será (...) estruturado como uma exploração de cada uma das dimensões desse espaço, a saber: o Espírito como auto-‑relação; o Espírito como imaginação produtiva; e o Espírito como o resultado do processo de aprendizado fundado nos impulsos humanos. (shrink)

Résumé L’article vise à souligner la signification politique de l’avènement de la Critique kantienne. Pour ce faire, une double thèse est défendue : il y a une matrice juridique sous-jacente au mouvement conceptuel de la philosophie critique, dont la puissance émancipatrice et révolutionnaire se manifeste à la lumière du contexte historique de sa formulation. L’argument se déploie de la façon suivante : une exploration des rapports entre la formule « révolution de la pensée » que l’on trouve dans la Critique (...) de la raison pure et le contexte historique de la publication l’œuvre ; ensuite un examen de la métaphore juridique et la façon dont elle incarne l’idée d’une philosophie critique ; et pour conclure la suggestion d’une hypothèse interprétative d’après laquelle le « contrat originaire » est un opérateur conceptuel accomplissant un mouvement analogue à celui qui est exigé de la philosophie critique : le passage du niveau individuel au niveau intersubjectif.The aim of the article is to highlight the political significance of the advent of Kant’s Critique. In order to establish it, a double thesis is defended: there is a juridical matrix underlying the conceptual movement of the critical philosophy, whose emancipatory and revolutionary strength is revealed in the light of the context of its formulation. The argument will be deployed in the following way: an exploration of the connections between the formula “a revolution in thought” articulated in the Critique and the historical context of its publication; followed by an exam of the juridical metaphor of the Tribunal and the way in which it embodies the idea of a critical philosophy and finally, as a conclusion, the suggestion of an interpretative hypothesis according to which the notion of contract is a conceptual operator accomplishing an analogous movement to the one required from the critical philosophy: the passage from the subjective level to the intersubjective one. (shrink)

Ce travail avance l’idée que le projet philosophique fichtéen consiste en une exploration de la notion même de philosophie dont les contours peuvent être esquissés à partir du remplacement du nom "Philosophia" par le nom Wissenschaftslehre. Cette substitution est le fruit d’une réflexion sur les conditions de possibilité non seulement de la connaissance scientifique, mais aussi du savoir philosophique en tant que tel, lequel doit être compris non comme un rapport sujet-objet, mais comme une activité autoréflexive visant à articuler une (...) vision systématique du tout. Une telle conception pose un défi au langage philosophique, en ceci qu’il ne saurait être conçu comme un langage représentatif et qu’il devient par là, selon Fichte, irréductible à un texte écrit ; face à ce défi, il est nécessaire de constamment réactiver le philosopher derrière les concepts, ce que Fichte fait, selon nous, en présentant sa philosophie dans différentes langues conceptuelles. Le constant éveil de cette activité dépend pourtant d’un travail pédagogique visant à : (i) rapprocher la langue savante de la langue quotidienne, (ii) engendrer une conscience historique et (iii) établir un espace d’apprentissage collectif. (shrink)

This paper advances the idea that Oswald de Andrade's Anthropophagy, formulated for the first time in 1928, can be read as a decolonial project avant la lettre. In order to establish this thesis, we will reconstruct the project of the Brazilian thinker through a detailed analysis of the first aphorism of his Manifesto Antropófago (Anthropophagist Manifesto). We will argue that, similarly to what will be later articulated by the decolonial approach, Andrade indicates: (i) that the cultural and economic dimensions of (...) colonialism are entangled ramifications of a larger structure of domination; (ii) that capitalism is an aspect of this larger structure; and (iii) that it is necessary to articulate a third political path irreducible to both capitalism and communism. Anthropophagy would thus function not only as the evident metaphor of cultural appropriation, but also as a diagnosis of the colonial domination and as a therapeutic to face it within a decolonial project. (shrink)